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In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies three
categories of friendship: friendships of utility, pleasure, and
virtue. He further argues that friendships are a necessary part
of the eudaimon life for people (1155a) as well as a relevant
aspect of a successful and unified polity, for they serve the
legislators’ goal to “expel civil conflict” and promote justice
(1155a25). The question arises as to what type of friendship
best characterizes such ‘civic friendship.’ Many scholars,
including Sibyl Schwartzenbach in her paper “On Civic
Friendships,” take Aristotle to argue that political friendships
are friendships of utility (105). However, I will argue that a
more appropriate interpretation of Aristotle’s work indicates
that political friendship is actually a virtue friendship. Since
Aristotle clearly considers cultivating virtue to be a significant
part of a legislator’s role in a polis, I will argue that it clearly
follows that legislators must not only tend to concord and
justice between the citizens, but also, to foster the best sort
of friendship between citizens. Lastly, I will consider certain
aspects of the United States current political climate to show
the danger of deflating civic friendship to a relationship
grounded solely on utility.
I. Schwartzenbach’s View of Civic Friendship as Utility
Friendship
Schwarzenbach, in her paper “On Civic Friendship,”
argues that modern political thought seems to have
abandoned Aristotle’s premise that a thriving political society
is characterized by friendship between citizens among
themselves and between leaders and their populace. She
states that “a plethora of views on the problem of political
unity… barely mention friendship or else explicitly reject it as
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a serious contender.” Schwarzenbach hopes to counteract this
development by arguing that “political friendship emerges
as a necessary condition for genuine justice” and a unified
“modern state” (98).
Schwarzenbach begins her argument by offering
an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of friendship. She
argues that all types of friendship, including “both pleasure
and [utility] friendships for Aristotle necessarily retain the
aspect of wishing the other well for that other’s own sake”
(100). She further argues that even friendships where “one
loves the other friend under some particular and limited
description only,” such as advantage or utility friendship, the
object of the friends’ love is the other person (100). However,
if this is the case, she still must offer a description to save
Aristotle’s distinction between utility, pleasure, and virtue
friendships. She accomplishes this by arguing that “what in fact
distinguishes virtue friendship from the other two kinds is,
rather, that the description under which one loves the other is
a description of that other’s whole (or near whole) character”
(100).
All of Schwarzenbach’s analyses are directed at
justifying an expansive reading of advantage or utility
friendships so that her underlying assumption that civic
friendships are of that type becomes more palatable. Her
overall goal is to argue that the political unity necessary to
reclaim our overly partisan modern state can be achieved
through a “political friendship, that is, the traits of mutual
awareness, of wishing the other well for their own sake, and
of doing things for the civic friend are still retained… [and]
evidenced in a general concern ” (105). However, I argue that
her interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the three types of
friendship and her categorization of civic friendship is not
strongly supported by the text. Instead, her claims that civic
friendship is characterized by mutual valuing of other citizens
for themselves would be better supported by an interpretation
of Aristotle that places civic friendship in the category of virtue
friendships.
II. Virtue Friendships
Like Schwarzenbach, I think that political unity is
best served by relationships between citizens founded on an
appreciation of each other’s value as a person and a desire that
each citizen receive the good things in life. However, upon my
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analysis of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , I find substantive
evidence that somewhat contradicts Schwarzenbach’s claim that
the quality of ‘valuing the friend for themselves’ is to be found
in all types of friendships. Beginning with his classification of
the types of friendships, Aristotle states that the types of love
are distinguished by “the three objects of love. For each object
of love has a corresponding type of mutual loving” (1156a7). I
take this to mean that utility friendships are those in which the
object of love is not the person themselves, nor the description
under which the person themselves is loved as Schwarzenbach
interpreted. Instead, the object of love is that aspect of the
person that the friend finds useful, or perhaps even the services
the friend provides. Furthermore, in utility friendships the
friends do not wish goods on the other for their own sake,
rather “those who love each other wish goods to each other
[only] insofar as they love each other. Those who love each
other for utility love the other not in his own right, but insofar
as they gain some good for themselves from him” (1156a10).
Aristotle writes further that “those who love for utility or
pleasure, then, are fond of a friend because of what is good or
pleasant for themselves, not insofar as the beloved is who he
is, but insofar as he is useful or pleasant” (1156a15). Thus, we
must search for another explanation for how civic friendships
contain the qualities of valuing the friend for themselves and
their characters, and wish goods for their friend’s own sake as
both Schwarzenbach and I believe they do.
Now that we can set aside utility and pleasure
friendships as contenders for the categorization of civic
friendships, I will turn to the remaining type: virtue
or character friendships. Aristotle argues that virtue
friendships have three main features: they are between
equals (1157b37, 1158b), each friend values the other for
themselves and their whole character (1157b2), and each
friend wants good things for the other, for the other’s sake
(1155b28). He considers these types of friendships the most
complete and friendship-like friendship there is. The other
types of friendships are sometimes said to merely “[bear]
some resemblance to this complete sort” (1157a). There is
one additional qualification of these friendships: “complete
friendship is the friendship of good people similar in
virtue….Hence these people’s friendship lasts as long as
they are good; and virtue is enduring” (1156b7).
Virtue friendships are overall the best friendships,
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according to Aristotle. Such friends value the other for
themselves and their characters. As such, they are willing to
do the work necessary to preserve and maintain their friend’s
virtues (11596). Altogether, it seems that virtue friendships
serve the goals of Schwarzenbach’s civic friendships more
clearly in the text. However, it remains to be seen whether
Aristotle would see it that way. In my next section, I
will advance my argument that Aristotle too would have
categorized civic friendships as virtue friendships, or at the
very least, more like virtue friendships than utility friendships.
III. Virtuous Civic Friendships and Concord
It is clear throughout the sections on friendship in the
Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle sees friendship as an integral
part of a successful political society. He states that “friendship
would seem to hold cities together, and legislators would seem
to be more concerned about it than about justice” because
good friends won’t need justice and regulations from political
leaders in order to do right by their fellow citizens (1155a25).
Though it is clear Aristotle believes in a sort of civic friendship,
he does not state clearly how to classify it according to his
three kinds of friendship or whether it forms an independent
type of friendship altogether. However, in considering his
description of concord, I argue that virtue friendship would
best characterize civic friendship.
Aristotle states that “concord would seem to be similar
to friendship” (1155a25). Indeed, he goes farther by arguing
that “a city is said to be in concord when [its citizens] agree
on what is advantageous, make the same decision, and act on
their common resolution” (1167a25). Furthermore, “concord,
then, is apparently [civic] friendship… for it is concerned
with advantage and with what affects life [as a whole]”
(1167b, brackets in original). At first glance, this statement
would seem to indicate that concord, and the friendship it
implies, is a relationship based on mutual utility. I argue that
this interpretation is incorrect for in the next breath, Aristotle
claims that “concord is found in decent people…. They
wish for what is just and advantageous, and also seek it in
common” (1167b5) and that “base people, however, cannot be
in concord” (1167b10). Therefore, base people, or unvirtuous
people, cannot develop civic friendships. From these, it seems
quite clear that concord, or civic friendships, must be a sort
of virtue friendship. I think perhaps the source of confusion
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is inappropriately conflating ‘advantage’ with ‘utility’. In the
context of the above passage, the advantage that is discussed
is not for some immediate good for an individual such as
would be served by utility. Rather, it deals with an advantage
that is held in common, shared between the various citizens.
Additionally, the advantage mentioned is that which “affects
life [as a whole]” (1167b, brackets in original) which more
appropriately refers to the advantages of a whole life well lived
with virtue.
Additional evidence for my argument that civic
friendships are virtue friendships can be found earlier
in the text. To clarify the statement that civic friendships
are founded on advantage, I’ll briefly discuss the type
of advantage specific to civic society. In a political
community, Aristotle writes that citizens and legislators
“aim not at some advantage close at hand, but at
advantage for the whole of life” (1160a20). Advantage for
the whole life, I would argue could roughly correspond
to the good. The good, as we know from the rest of
Nicomachean Ethics, is achieved through a whole long life
(1100a7) of activity in accordance with virtue (1099a15)
accompanied by sufficient external goods (1099a30) and
friends (1170b17).
Furthermore, cultivating virtues within their citizens
seems to be part of the excellence of the legislator. Aristotle
wrote “it is finer and more divine to acquire and preserve
[the good] for… people and for cities” (1094b10), and “the
goal of political science [is] the best good; and most of its
attention is devoted to the character of the citizens, to make
them good people who do fine actions” (1099b30). Clearly,
there is a relationship between legislators’ goals to promote
concord, chase away enmity between citizens, and develop
their virtue. With legislators necessarily preoccupied with
habituating good character, it seems right that the friendships
that develop between such citizens would recognize the
value of their counterparts as tied up with their virtue. I see
a strong connection with the legislators’ responsibility to tend
to the virtues of the citizens and their other roles around
producing advantageous conditions for people’s whole lives
and their goal of producing concord. Each of these goals feed
into one another. Thus, it seems quite fitting to categorize
the relationships between citizens on a horizontal axis, and
between citizens and their legislators on a vertical axis, as
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virtue friendships.
IV. Legislators’ Responsibility for Civic Virtue and
Concord: Worries About American Politics
Considering politics today, it is quite obvious that
people care about the ethical characters of their fellow citizens.
Citizens worry about the questionably moral choices of their
elected officials–vote trading, bailouts to big corporations over
small businesses, and campaigns marked by big-spender
schmoozing. On top of these activities between legislators,
newspaper opinion columns are replete with editorials
lamenting the rise of rancorous partisanship, especially in the
wake of the 2016 and 2020 elections. It seems quite obvious that
the United States has lost even the semblance of civic unity
or agreement over what is advantageous for the nation as a
whole. I argue that this situation may stem, at least in part,
from an abdication of responsibility by our leaders to “aim
at concord among all, while they try above all to expel civil
conflict, which is enmity” (1155a25). While citizens seem to
care increasingly about their fellow citizens’ moral character,
legislators seem to have set aside any hope of developing any
kind of relationship among citizens marked by mutual valuing
of another for themselves.
Congress has done little to catalyze an appreciation
among citizens of their common good and common goals. Not
only have they failed to address the rising partisanship among
the populace, they seem to fuel it with rhetoric saturated with
political rage and revolving around stimulating contempt and
partisan enmity. Some elected officials, like retiring senator
Tom Udall, have raised concerns about “a culture [that] valued
partisanship over the country’s best interests” (Broadwater).
I think that many of us are tired of the discord and contempt
that marks our political relationships. I believe that one
possible solution to these attitudes is a shift from thinking of
our fellow citizens as means to our individual advantage to
an appreciation of them as people who are valuable in and of
themselves.
In most modern liberal democracies and republics,
there is an underlying doctrine of viewpoint neutrality–that
a precondition for living together in a diverse nation is in part
contingent on one’s fellow citizens minding their own business
on certain (sometimes moral, especially religious) matters.
I am not convinced that such neutrality is inconsistent with
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forming character friendships between citizens. However,
that would be a subject for further questioning. Altogether,
if politicians and ordinary people could begin to cultivate
relationships even at the local or community level founded
on desiring the good things in life for their neighbors because
they are good neighbors, a new culture of unity could arise.
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